

world, we face the prospect of mass instability in Mexico itself. We have seen this in the Chiapas insurgency which is not yet resolved by any means. We have seen it in instances of political killings. I do not want to get in any way abrasive, but I commented on this floor at one point that Mexico is a country where you can murder arch-bishops and say they inadvertently wandered into the line of fire in a police action involving drug dealers, which was the equivalent of being shot while in church.

Mr. President, Mr. Paul Gigot, in this morning's Wall Street Journal, writes that if we fail to stem the crisis, we "can expect more Mexican sons and daughters to arrive in San Diego soon". Unwilling to stay in Mexico, seeking a promise of better opportunities, overwhelming the opportunities of our own people in our own country.

We cannot do that. We cannot risk undermining a reviving Argentina economy, a promising Brazilian economy. We cannot put at risk the efforts around the world of countries that moved away from centrally controlled, to use a French term, "dirigiste" regimes in which American investment is kept out, American goods kept out, autarky I think as the economists would call it, and with the result of economic stagnation.

The courage—and it takes courage—to open up, to be part of the world economy is more and more in evidence everywhere. That courage could turn into fear and retreat in a very short order if we do not act.

I would like to congratulate the majority leader of the Senate, ROBERT DOLE, and the minority leader, TOM DASCHLE, for their willingness to meet with the President, in the company of their counterparts from the House, to bring forth a bipartisan American initiative which is very much directed to the protection of American interests, and I hope it succeeds. I hope it finds support on the Senate floor with Senators generally as it has done with the leadership.

I thank my friends for their patience. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for morning business with Senators permitted to speak up to no more than 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### UNPROFOR: END ITS IMPOTENCE OR END ITS MISSION

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I had the opportunity last evening to join Senator DOLE in meeting with British Gen. Rupert Smith, who will take command

of the United Nations force, known as UNPROFOR, in Bosnia later this month. A few other Senators also had a chance to meet with General Smith yesterday.

Senator DOLE and I expressed admiration for General Smith's willingness to take on this unenviable task. But we also expressed skepticism that UNPROFOR can improve its credibility in order to more effectively carry out its limited mission of facilitating humanitarian relief and lessening the violence in Bosnia. But the change in command in UNPROFOR does at least offer the opportunity to try to adopt measures to make UNPROFOR more effective.

I recall that a year ago, when UNPROFOR's leadership was rotating, American military officials responsible for the humanitarian airlift and air-drops in Bosnia proposed to take advantage of the situation to reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility and its ability to fulfill its mandate in Bosnia.

They proposed that UNPROFOR end its "'mother may I?' construct of operations," and they outlined a plan by which UNPROFOR, even with its restrictive rules of engagement and limited troops and equipment, could use force to more effectively carry out its humanitarian mission and curb Serb and other harassment of UNPROFOR. These American military officers warned that if such action were not taken, an already bad situation would quickly get much worse.

When he first took command of UNPROFOR in January, Lt. Gen. Michael Rose took actions that suggested he might follow this advice. But this initial promise faded as General Rose became even more pliable to Serb demands than previous UNPROFOR commanders had been. The results have been disastrous:

UNPROFOR has all along had difficulty supplying food, fuel, and medical supplies to Bosnian civilians suffering the privations of war. Now, UNPROFOR cannot be sure it can supply its own emaciated troops.

The United Nations declared a weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo but refused to enforce it despite routine Serb violations. Now, it has effectively become a Serb-declared exclusion zone from which humanitarian air flights are blocked at the whim of Serb forces.

In the past, UNPROFOR had been humiliated by being compelled to assist Serbs in the deportation of detained Muslims. Now, UNPROFOR has been rendered impotent by having its own forces detained and used as human shields against NATO air attacks. Some UNPROFOR troops seem to have become willing hostages who engage their Serb captors in sports and feasts.

In short, continued UNPROFOR's submission to Serb demands and threats may make it impossible for it to fulfill its mandate. While things appear to have improved in recent weeks, with relief flights resumed and U.N. forces not held hostage, this has only been at the discretion of the Serbs, who

can reverse course at any time. All sides in the conflict have sought to manipulate UNPROFOR to their own ends, but Serb forces have largely succeeded in making UNPROFOR a tool of Serb strategy, and the recent improvement should be seen in that light.

This situation will only get worse over time unless UNPROFOR can gain credibility it has never enjoyed.

Either prompt, dramatic action should be taken to establish UNPROFOR's credibility and its ability to do its humanitarian job or UNPROFOR should be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The plan proposed last winter by American military officers may have worked if implemented then, but it is probably too late today. Certain elements of that plan, however, are still relevant and even more critical in light of Croatia's recent announcement not to extend UNPROFOR's mandate in that country beyond March 31:

Discredited UNPROFOR leaders cannot change the situation. Any effort to revitalize UNPROFOR must be accompanied by new leaders. General Rose, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, will be replaced on January 24 by General Smith. Yasushi Akashi, the U.N. Secretary General's representative for the former Yugoslavia, must be replaced, as well.

The U.N.-declared no-fly zones and weapons-exclusion zones in Bosnia, now widely flouted, primarily by the Serbs, should be enforced. This includes the withdrawal of SAM's from the zone and deactivation of SAM's in the surrounding area that threaten NATO aircraft policing the zones.

UNPROFOR should no longer tolerate checkpoints operated by belligerents nor should it pay tolls, extortion by belligerents of fuel and other humanitarian supplies. If belligerents question whether a convoy is going to its declared civilian destination, they should be permitted to ride the convoy.

UNPROFOR should organize its convoys along military lines and reject Serb demands that include armored vehicles and similar demands.

Any use of force or threat of force against UNPROFOR should be met with force. While such retaliation must be measured according to its objective, it need not be limited to retaliation against the specific offending forces, given the targeting difficulties often involved and the need for UNPROFOR to acquire the upper hand.

As for the concern that adopting such an approach would endanger UNPROFOR troops now detained by Serbs, the reality is that unless such an approach is adopted immediately, all UNPROFOR troops will be endangered—whether formally detained or not. Action can either be taken to reverse the current situation, or it will only get worse.

If UNPROFOR refuses to adopt such an approach, it should be withdrawn in

as swift and orderly a manner as possible. The United States should, of course, provide the necessary assistance to help our allies and friends in UNPROFOR withdraw. This may include the temporary deployment of ground forces in Bosnia. End the impotence or end the mission.

Any action by any of the belligerents to interfere with the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be met by overwhelming force. Such force should not be limited to targeting those belligerent forces directly involved in interfering with the withdrawal. Instead, given the difficulties often involved in targeting the offending forces and the need to dominate the battlefield during a withdrawal, targets could include anything of military, political or economic value to the belligerents. Nor should we exclude targets outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, given that much of the impetus and sustenance for the conflict has come from outside its border.

Once UNPROFOR has withdrawn, NATO should continue to enforce the exclusion zone around Sarajevo to the extent possible without excessively endangering allied forces.

#### THE BROADER BALKEN CONTEXT

Given the Clinton administration's support for keeping UNPROFOR in Bosnia, and presumably trying to make it more effective there, the administration should work with our allies to reverse Croatia's decision to end UNPROFOR's mandate in that country. This might be possible if, parallel to adopting the measures I have proposed for UNPROFOR in Bosnia, a serious effort were made to revitalize UNPROFOR in Croatia, where it has been as much a tool of Serb strategy as in Bosnia.

The Clinton administration has nominally recognized the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], but in response to pressure from domestic groups has refused to fulfill this decision by sending an ambassador. This is an important foreign policy issue, not a election spoil. A professional diplomat should be dispatched forthwith as ambassador with a mandate to assist in the reconciliation among ethnic groups in that country and between Skopje and Athens.

Both Presidents Bush and Clinton threatened to use military force against Serbia if it should employ blatant force in Kosovo, Serbia's Albania-populated province along its southern border with Albania and Macedonia. While Serbia has been slowly tightening its grip over the once autonomous Kosovo, this American threat remains useful to discourage overt and widespread violence. Congress should explicitly endorse this threat to make it more credible.

Mr. President, during our meeting yesterday, General Rose emphasized that he was going to have to play the hand he has been dealt, and do so with the players who are already at the

table, including the Bosnian Serb leadership.

It is true that we have to shape our policy based on the situation as it exists today. No one can go back and undue what has happened over the last 3 years. But we can learn from the mistakes of the last 3 years.

The measures I have proposed would seek to do so. But from what I heard from General Smith, I am afraid that UNPROFOR will continue down the path it is on. If so, the quagmire that is now up to its waist will soon be up to its neck. And at that point, the task of pulling it out and bringing it home will be much more difficult and costly.

With that, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. DOLE pertaining to the introduction of S. 230 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

#### EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

EC-82. A communication from the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report entitled "Observed Weaknesses in the District's Procurement System and Possible Remedies"; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-83. A communication from the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report entitled "Review of the Implementation of Audit Recommendations for the Public Access Corporation of the District of Columbia"; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-84. A communication from the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor, transmitting, pursuant to law the report entitled "Analysis of the June 20, 1994 Transactional Framework for the D.C. Arena Project"; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-85. A communication from the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of D.C. Act 10-340 adopted by the Council on November 1, 1994; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-86. A communication from the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of D.C. Act 10-341 adopted by the Council on November 1, 1994; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-87. A communication from the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of D.C. Act 10-342 adopted by the Council on November 1, 1994; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-88. A communication from the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of D.C. Act 10-343 adopted by the Council on November 1, 1994; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-89. A communication from the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of D.C. Act 10-344 adopted by the Council on November 1, 1994; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-90. A communication from the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of D.C. Act 10-345 adopted by the Council on November 1, 1994; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-91. A communication from the Chairman of the Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of D.C. Act 10-346 adopted by the Council on November 1, 1994; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. LUGAR, from the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, without amendment:

S. Res. 53. An original resolution authorizing expenditures by the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (Rept. No. 104-3).

#### INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. DOMENICI:

S. 226. A bill to designate additional land as within the Chaco Culture Archeological Protection Sites, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

By Mr. HATCH (for himself and Mrs. FEINSTEIN):

S. 227. A bill to amend title 17, United States Code, to provide an exclusive right to perform sound recordings publicly by means of digital transmissions and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BRYAN (for himself, Mr. THOMPSON, Mr. SANTORUM, and Mr. INHOFE):

S. 228. A bill to amend certain provisions of title 5, United States Code, relating to the treatment of Members of Congress and Congressional employees for retirement purposes; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

By Mr. DASCHLE (for Mr. BAUCUS):

S. 229. A bill to require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to conduct risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses in promulgating regulations relating to human health and the environment, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. SIMON, Mr. HELMS, Mr. ROBB, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. GRAMM, and Mr. HATFIELD):

S. 230. A bill to prohibit United States assistance to countries that prohibit or restrict the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

By Mr. KEMPTHORNE (for himself, Mr. WARNER, Mr. DOLE, Mr. CRAIG,